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Abstract—Client-side malware can attack users by tampering
with applications or user interfaces to generate requests that
users did not intend. We propose Verified Intention (VInt), which
ensures a network request, as received by a service, is user-
intended. VInt is based on “seeing what the user sees” (context).
VInt screenshots the user interface as the user interacts with a
security-sensitive form. There are two main components. First,
VInt ensures output integrity and authenticity by validating the
context, ensuring the user sees correctly rendered information.
Second, VInt extracts user-intended inputs from the on-screen
user-provided inputs, with the assumption that a human user
checks what they entered. Using the user-intended inputs, VInt
deems a request to be user-intended if the request is generated
properly from the user-intended inputs while the user is shown
the correct information. VInt is implemented using image analysis
and Optical Character Recognition (OCR). Our evaluation shows
that VInt is accurate and efficient.
I. INTRODUCTION
Our society is increasingly reliant on online services to
perform daily tasks, ranging from online banking, messaging,
and even the management of household appliances. Due to the
increasing functionality provided by these services and their
sensitive nature, they can be a lucrative target for malicious ac-
tors. A common target is the communication channel between
the user making the service request and the server machine in
the “cloud” processing and fulfilling it. Malicious tampering
with this channel can result in a variety of harmful attacks,
including hijacked bank transfers or the impersonation of an
unsuspecting user.
We break the user-server channel into two segments: user-
machine and machine-machine. The security of the communi-
cation channel between the user’s client machine and the server
machine has been explored in-depth, through hash functions,
checksums, and authentication protocols such as TLS. How-
ever, an often overlooked component is the communication
channel between the human user making the service request
and their own machine that processes the request, which can
be compromised and make malicious requests on behalf of the
user without detection by the remote server machine. Similar
to the machine-machine channel, the integrity and authenticity
of this channel are integral to the online service model.
A primary challenge in securing the human-machine com-
munication channel is that it is asymmetric in nature and must
handle user input on one end and computer output on the other.
Unlike the machine-machine channel, which is symmetric and
whose integrity and authenticity can be verified using the same
methods in both directions, securing the human-machine chan-
nel requires protecting the integrity and authenticity of both
the rendering of computer output to the user, as well as the
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Fig. 1: Context Hid-
ing: The original page is
shown on the left with
the green area being the
secure display in prior
works [5], [6]. User inputs to the green areas are protected and no
overlay can be drawn on top of it. Alice got redirected to a page
with the appearance shown on the right. It asks for a donation with
an authentic-looking protected form. If Alice proceeds to fill in the
details for the donation, the money will be transferred to Mallory.
processing of user inputs by the computer. In this work, we aim
to secure this human-machine interface using user intention.
Specifically, we deem user inputs to be user-intended when
integrity and authenticity are achieved in both directions (input
and output). A network request is user-intended if it is securely
generated from user-intended inputs.
Prior works on securing the human-machine channel lack
complete integrity or authenticity guarantees. NAB [1] and
Binder [2] infer user intention through heuristics, and provide
neither input nor output integrity and authenticity. Gyrus [3]
provides input integrity and authenticity by asking the human
user to confirm inputs shown on the display, but it provides
no guarantee on the computer output. Recent works [4]–[6]
point out that input integrity does not hold alone unless out-
put integrity is also achieved, as human users may be fooled
by attacker-generated deceptive content and give unintended
inputs. However, these works protect a simplified rendering
engine inside some secure software module and only provide
output integrity guarantee for a subset of the user interface.
Despite the extra user effort required to distinguish protected
content from unprotected content on the same screen, the fact
that not the entire screen is protected enables new attacks.
The lack of complete output integrity allows an attacker
to send out user unintended requests. Inspired by prior user
interface (UI) attacks such as clickjacking [7], [8], we identify
a new class of user interface attack that we call “context
forgery”, where an attacker tricks the user into sending out
unintended requests through a luring and deceptive user in-
terface (i.e. the “context”). Different from clickjacking, which
causes unintended actions locally, context forgery aims to lure
the user into sending out unintended requests to a remote
service. In particular, we account for malicious actors that
have OS-level privilege on the user’s machine and that attack
the browsers platform on x86 architecture. This combination
is chosen because it is the hardest case of having to defeat a
context forgery attack.
We propose four variations of context forgery attacks that
violate output integrity and authenticity and cause unintended
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requests to be generated. In particular, one variant, called con-
text hiding, can defeat the protection offered by prior works
with embedded trusted displays [4]–[6] and still send out user-
unintended requests. Context hiding exploits the fact that there
are unprotected areas on the display by hiding everything ex-
cept the trusted display creating a crafted and misleading con-
text. An example of the context hiding attack is shown in Fig 1.
Our solution. We propose Verified Intention (VInt), a frame-
work for capturing semantic-rich user intentions and protect-
ing a service from unintended requests. VInt aims to achieve
full integrity and authenticity of the human-computer channel,
which prior works provide partially. Our method is based on
the observation that network requests originate from a spe-
cific context and we can ensure integrity and authenticity by
observing this context. VInt captures the context by taking
continuous screenshots of user interactions while the user
interacts with a security-sensitive website. To achieve output
integrity and authenticity, VInt checks whether the user was
shown the correct text and images; to achieve input integrity
and authenticity, VInt refers to the human user by correlating
hardware IO with on-screen activities — we assume the user
ensures that on-screen user-provided inputs are user-intended
through a “what you enter is what you wanted (WYEIWYW)”
principle: inputs vetted by the human user are integrity- and
authenticity-protected. VInt ensures that an actual human is
present by checking hardware IO events, which can only be
performed by a physical human. With full input and output
integrity and authenticity, user-provided inputs represent user
intention because the user provided them after shown the
proper information.
We implement VInt in a secure virtual machine (VM)
on Xen using OpenCV image analysis and Tesseract Optical
Character Recognition (OCR). We show that VInt can defend
against our proposed attacks with a minimal trusted computing
base (TCB), reducing the potential attack surface. We evaluate
VInt on 119 web pages, and show that VInt achieves high
accuracy and negligible performance in most cases.
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
• We identify a set of context forgery attacks that can send
out user unintended requests solely by violating the output
integrity and authenticity.
• We propose the use of context (screenshots of the user
interactions with a web page) to verify user intentions,
securing the integrity, authenticity of the input and output
of the human-machine channel.
• We show that VIntcan defeat proposed context forgery
attacks, obtain a 98.2% accuracy and require only 0.165
seconds in 1920 by 1080 resolution in most cases on 119
commercial web pages.
II. DEFINITIONS AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Definitions
We define the following concepts related to our work:
• Machine output: The content shown on the Graphical
User Interface (GUI). We refer machine output to just
output in the rest of the paper.
• User input: The physical inputs a user gives to the com-
puter and the machine’s processing of those inputs. We
refer user input to just input in the rest of the paper.
• Output integrity and authenticity: when the machine out-
put is rendered correctly without an attacker’s inference
(integrity) from the proper source (authenticity).
• Input integrity and authenticity: when the user inputs are
processed correctly (integrity) from the legitimate user
(authenticity).
• User intended inputs: the inputs a user gives to the ma-
chine under with integrity and authenticity guarantees of
both input and output.
• User intended requests: a request that is properly gener-
ated based on user intended inputs.
B. User-impersonating Attacks
We discuss the user-impersonating attacks that we address
in this paper. We show how we classify user-impersonating
attacks as either request forgery or context forgery. We show
examples of user-impersonating attacks.
1) Attack Definitions: Malware can craft network requests
to a remote service without the user’s awareness. This type of
attack is called a user-impersonating attack [4], as the service is
not able to distinguish whether a request is malware-generated
or human-intended. User-impersonating attacks have demon-
strated their effectiveness in stealing money [9], fake user ads
clicks [10] and usage fraud [11].
User-impersonating attacks can be launched by attackers
at various levels. Similar to prior works [1], [3]–[6], [12],
this work assumes an OS-level attacker on the web browser
platform. An OS-level malware is the hardest to defend against
due to its privilege, which can be used to hide its presence and
access unprotected memory. We work with browsers as 1) they
are applicable to both desktop and mobile platforms, 2) they
suffer from a rendering variation problem (§III-D) and 3) the
remote service has the least control over them. For applica-
tions, the service can incorporate defenses that are not available
for web pages. For instance, Trusted Execution Environments
(TEE), such as Intel SGX [13] and Arm TrustZone [14], for
user-level malware.
We classify user-impersonating attacks into two types: re-
quest and context forgery. Request forgery is when a request
is created or existing requests are changed without a user’s
awareness. For instance, malware can forge a money transfer
request to the attacker’s PayPal account [9]. Prior works [3]–
[6], [12] provide input integrity and authenticity to defeat these
attacks through secure IO and request generation. The more
interesting attack, which is also the focus of this paper, is
context forgery. Context forgery is when an attacker presents
a misleading user interface to lure users to perform actions
that send out unintended requests. Prior works do not defeat
against context forgery due to the lack of full output integrity.
Attack Model. When an attacker attempts to tamper with the
IO data flow [15]–[18] or tamper with the execution integrity
of the request generation [19], he violates the input integrity,
authenticity, or execution integrity of the request, for which we
refer to as a request forgery attack. When an attacker attempts
to tamper with the local user interface (UI) similar to prior
works [7], [8] and does not violate any properties in a request
forgery attack, he violates output integrity or authenticity, for
which we refer to as a context forgery attack. Although a
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context forgery attack does not require OS-level privilege, an
OS-level malware still has the ability to modify UI.
2) User-impersonating Attack Examples: We focus on the
design aspect of attacks than the implementation side.
Request Forgery. There are two variants of request forgery.
1) Forgery: an attacker can forge a request without the user’s
awareness. For instance, an attacker in the early form submis-
sion attack proposed in ProtectION [6] emulates a mouse click
before the user completes the form, which results in an incom-
plete and thus unintended request being generated. 2) Tamper-
ing: an attacker tampers with user inputs to a request or the
execution integrity of the request to send out user-unintended
requests. For instance, parameter tampering attack [20] violates
the integrity of user inputs.
Context Forgery. To show context forgery attacks, we break
UI elements into two types: service and host depending on
who owns the elements. Service-owned elements include all
elements on the web page itself, which were sent from the
service, while host-owned elements include the display of user
inputs, cursor and the browser toolbars. Therefore, context
forgery attacks can be split into three types: service UI tam-
pering, host UI tampering and temporal integrity violation.
Variant #1 and #2: Service UI Tampering. The attacker
tampers with the user interface rendered from data owned
by the service. The user may be tricked into believing that
the page comes from the service. There are two variants: 1)
minimum area (Fig 7): the attacker modifies a small region
of the UI, hoping the user will not notice. The attacker can
indirectly tamper with the request if the human user relies on
the tampered information in generating the request. 2) context
hiding (Fig 1): certain UI elements may prevent UI overlays,
therefore, the attacker can craft all other UI elements and
expose only the protected ones, giving the user a misleading
crafted context. This attack can be applied to works [4]–[6]
with an embedded secure window.
Variant #3: Host UI Tampering. The attacker tampers with
the UI elements owned by the local system. Examples of host
UI elements include the display of textual inputs, the mouse
cursor and the browser toolbars. Due to the fact that these UI
elements are owned by the local host, there is no ground truth
to validate the appearance against. An attacker can modify the
host UI and trick the user into having an incorrect perception
of the state of the machine and generating requests from an
unintended system state. An example is illustrated in Fig 2.
Amount: 1 0 
Bank Web Page Fig. 2: Host UI Tampering: as Alice
types 100 in the amount field, the dis-
play of the second 0 is intentionally
hidden, causing Alice to perceive the
value as 10, while the computer holds
100 as the value. If Alice corrects the value to 100 by appending
another 0, then, the display will show 100, but the computer “sees”
the value as 1000. A request will then be generated with the amount
1000, which is not what Alice intended.
Variant #4: Temporal Integrity Violation. An attacker can
exploit defenses by violating the temporal integrity of the user
interface. Instead of tampering with the existing content of the
interface, the attacker overlays a new element but exploits the
asynchrony between when the user perceives an element on
the screen and when they act and provide input to the machine
in response to the element. An example is illustrated in Fig 3.
Yes No
Sending $100 to Bob?
Are you sure?
Fig. 3: Temporal Integrity Violation:
prior defense VB-W [4] requires user
confirmation inside a securely ren-
dered pop-up window at the end of
a user interaction session. The fixed
time can be exploited by an attacker by showing a series of pop-up
windows mimicking the appearance of the real confirmation window,
hoping that the user will spam clicks on the ”yes” button and will
not notice the content in the real pop-up window.
C. Discussion
The root cause of context forgery attack is that the seman-
tics of the user interface are being tampered with. Specifically,
text and images carry heavy semantics, and an attacker must
modify them so the user perceives them differently.
We show how prior works handle context forgery attacks
in Table I. We put a red cross when a prior work is vulnerable.
From left to right, we see improving progress in securing the
human-machine channel. Prior works range from providing
no guarantee at all (NAB [1] and Binder [2]), to input in-
tegrity (Gyrus [3]), to weak output integrity ( securely ren-
dered buttons in VB-B [4]), to stronger partial output integrity
(embedded secure window [5], [6]) and finally, to full output
integrity but fixed time intervals (aka temporal integrity is not
maintained [4], [12]). We have some observations.
Observation 1: Input integrity will not hold unless output
integrity is also achieved. Without output integrity, one cannot
infer the circumstance that the user entered the inputs —
the user might be fooled perceptually when entering inputs.
Minimum Tampering attack can bypass these defenses to send
out unintended requests.
Observation 2: Full output integrity must be enforced.
Securing a subset of the user interface means that the user will
still perceive from unprotected UI elements. Despite the extra
user effort to distinguish protected content, an attacker can still
make use of the unprotected elements to fool the human user
as shown by Context Hiding attack.
Observation 3: Output integrity must be maintained
throughout the user’s interaction session. Displaying a fully
secured confirmation page does not suffice, as 1) the UI is not
secured while the user perceives, the user may confirm unin-
tended requests and 2) the fixed time interval can be exploited
by Temporal Integrity Violation attack.
Observation 4visual: Dilemma between functionality rich-
ness and security for embedded window approaches. Fi-
delius [5] and ProtectION [6] achieve partial output integrity
through export-and-secure: a simplified rendering engine is
ported into a trusted module to ensure the correctness of the
rendering output. To support rich rendering features, a render-
ing engine must have a large codebase, which means a large
program needs to be secured. To achieve high security, the
trusted computing base size must be small [21]. This dilemma
limits the functionality in current works [5], [6] and is tied
to their export-and-secure approach, which is unlikely to be
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User-impersonating Attacks Violated Properties NAB [1]Binder [2] Gryus [3] VB-B [4]
Fidelius [5]
ProtectION [6]
VB-W [4]
UTP [12] VInt
Request Forgery Forgery Authenticity 8 4 4 4 4 4Tampering Input Integrity
Context Forgery
Minimum Tampering Output Integrity 8 8 8 4 4 4
Context Hiding Full Output Integrity and Authenticity 8 8 8 8 4 4
Host UI Tampering Output Integrity 8 8 8 4 4 4
Temporal Integrity Output Temporal Integrity n/a n/a n/a n/a 8 4
TABLE I: Comparison of VInt with other intention capture works on proposed user-impersonating attacks. n/a means the attack is not
applicable. We address VButton [4] with VB-B and VB-W standing for the trusted button and secure pop up window approaches.
solved with development in a secure software module or ren-
dering engines.
Strawman Approaches. One strawman approach is to take
a screenshot of a filled form after the user submits the form.
Output integrity can be enforced by validating the rendering
of the web page in the screenshot, while input integrity can
be inferred from the displayed inputs from the screenshot.
This method has flaws. One time screenshot cannot satisfy
R2, as temporal integrity is not maintained — an attacker can
show one set of crafted UI to the user and quickly swap to
a different set of legitimate UI before the screenshot is taken
[22]. A video recording of the user interaction at fixed inter-
vals, e.g. 30 frames per second, suffers from the same issue,
as the attacker can swap contexts at every frame capture. Sim-
ilarly, temporal integrity violation applies to inputs. Secondly,
sending a screenshot of the user’s activity to a remote server
raises privacy concerns. Lastly, it is unclear how a screenshot
can be validated as prior shows that individual client renders
the same content with variations [23]. A validation method
must be 1) robust to allowable difference and 2) sensitive to
tampering. Image hash [24] are designed for this task [25],
but they are insufficient in terms of preciseness (not sensitive
enough for single character change [26]) and robustness (can-
not differentiate horizontal flipped images [27]).
In summary, the problems with a screenshot approach are:
• Time-of-check-time-of-use problem (TOCTOU): an at-
tacker can show one set of UI when a screenshot is
captured, and another when the user interacts.
• A validation method must be robust and sensitive at the
same time.
• User input problem: how to ensure input integrity solely
from the user interface.
III. DESIGN
In this section, we will illustrate the idea of our defense
and go into the details of each component. Our approach is
still based on screenshots, for which we aim to solve the
shortcomings.
A. Assumptions
We list the assumptions in our work. VInt utilizes a stan-
dard virtualized environment with a trusted virtual machine
(VM) that executes most of VInt’s code and an untrusted guest
OS that owns the network stack, rendering stack and browser.
Any data from the OS is untrusted by VInt and if non-authentic
values are provided by the OS, it will only result in the request
being deemed as non-user-intended. We make the following
assumptions about the hypervisor:
• The hypervisor and the trusted VM (dom0) are mutually
trusted by the service and the user and provide isolation
of its memory from guests. This can be justified because
1) the hypervisor can attest its code integrity to the service
after boot [28], 2) the hypervisor can be set up securely
by the user at a trusted set-up time, and 3) its code can
be publicly audited.
• The hardware, including the processor, chipset, and pe-
ripherals, is trusted.
• The hypervisor has the ability to intercept input events
before a guest sees it. This is commonly available on
recent processors with Intel VT and AMD V.
• Availability is not considered.
Web Pages. VInt is not designed to work with all web pages.
VInt’s focus is to vet user intended requests, thus, VInt is pri-
marily used on security-sensitive forms such as money transac-
tion form. As a result, VInt assumes that a synchronous request
will be generated when the user completes the form and that
request will trigger security-sensitive actions on the service’s
side. This assumption does not prevent web pages from send-
ing asynchronous AJAX requests, but they are not validated.
Remote Service. VInt assumes a trustworthy and coopera-
tive remote service. The service, along with any data from
the service, such as HTML, CCS, and JavaScript are trusted.
This excludes phishing attacks where the service is malicious.
Phishing defenses and service authentication are orthogonal to
our work and can be integrated. We also assume the service is
cooperative in modifying its page to ease client-side operations
as it is one of the main beneficiaries of VInt. This assumption is
also common in prior works [5], [6] who require modification
of page source code. The exact requirements include:
• For output integrity and authenticity: VInt requires the
service to separate text from complex backgrounds, put
text with different font sizes in different lines and ensure
the absence of foreign languages. These requirements
come from our evaluation in §VI-B2.
• For input integrity and authenticity: VInt requires the ser-
vice to adopt a common design style of visual indicators
using CSS, which include 1) a blue focus box (outline on
focus) 2) a green non-blinking input cursor (caret) and
3) a blue selection color (selection:color). An example of
the caret and the focus box are shown in Fig 4. VInt only
supports textboxes and textareas, which need to be made
large enough for the size of anticipated inputs. These
requirements are discussed in §III-E.
We think many of these requirements are already met by
security-sensitive forms, as one of their design principles is
clearness and unambiguousness.
Human User. While the user interacts with the web page on
her desktop, we assume the user does not perceive information
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POFs
Submit
Button
Fig. 4: An example VInt-enabled web page with highlights on a user’s
position of focus (POF) and a submit button.
Fig. 5: An example trusted context generated by the service with
page breakdown annotated for illustration purpose. The colored boxes
indicate the corresponding validation method discussed in §III-D2.
from other sources for which VInt has no access and cannot
guarantee the integrity and authenticity. Incorrect information
shown on other sources can impact the user’s perception and
behavior [29]. VInt assumes a trustworthy user that is not
trying to intentionally send out requests and later claims the
request to be unintended. We will describe our user behavior
model in §III-E.
B. VInt Overview
We propose VInt, which ensures that outgoing network
requests to service are user-intended. VInt 1) captures “what
the user sees”, 2) ensures what the user sees is rendered cor-
rectly, 3) extracts the on-screen user-provided textual inputs,
and finally, 4) ensures an outgoing request to the service is
generated correctly from the user-intended inputs. Finally, VInt
sends only user intended requests to the remote service through
a cryptographic signature.
To capture what the user sees, VInt screenshots the users
interface while the user interacts with a security-sensitive form
with randomness to prevent TOCTOU attacks. The series of
screenshots are referred to as local context. VInt aims to
achieve integrity, authenticity and temporal integrity of the user
inputs and outputs solely from this context.
The output integrity and authenticity is achieved with ro-
bustness to non-semantic-changing differences and sensitive-
ness to semantic differences. VInt proposes a two-step method
VMM
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Fig. 6: An overview of VInt.
for validating the local context. First, VInt defines a rendering
manifest that contains a few client-side configurations which
result in semantic-changing rendering variations when ren-
dered by a client. A client-specific manifest is collected and
securely transmitted to the service. The service will generate
1) a rendering of the web page based on the rendering man-
ifest in a trusted environment, for which we refer to as the
trusted context, and 2) a breakdown of the web page to aid the
local validation. The local verification algorithm compares the
local context to the trusted context using image analysis and
Optical Character Recognition (OCR) to determine if they are
semantically equivalent. Semantically equivalence implies the
absence of context forgery attacks.
To achieve input integrity and authenticity, VInt requires
the help of the human user through an assumption called ”what
you enter is what you wanted” (WYEIWYW). WYEIWYW
requires the human user to ensure the displayed textual inputs
are user-intended. This assumption allows VInt to extract on-
screen textual inputs with integrity and authenticity guarantee.
However, since the user can only check the on-screen textual
inputs where she is focusing on, VInt must track the user’s
focus. VInt develops a model that translates a user’s focus to
visual indicators, which we refer to as the position of focus
(POF). Example of POF includes the blinking input cursor,
focus box and selection highlight. VInt extracts user inputs at
the POF before the focus is lost. Together with the contextual
information on the UI close to the user inputs, such as input
field labels, VInt can acquire the semantic of user inputs.
Because malware can fake the entire interaction while the
user is absent, VInt ensures that an actual human user is present
by correlating on-screen activities to hardware IO activities.
For instance, VInt requires on-screen textual inputs to appear
only shortly after keyboard IO activities.
Finally, the request sent to the service must be cryptograph-
ically signed by VInt upon 1) the successful validation of the
context for the entire session, and 2) the successful comparison
of the request and the extracted user-intended inputs.
1) Workflow: VInt’s main components are listed in Fig 6.
VInt’s main functionality is implemented inside a secure vir-
tual machine (VM), an untrusted browser plugin is responsible
to signal the begin and the end of a VInt session and the
handling of requests for validation.
VInt system begins when a VInt-enabled page has finished
loading (Fig 4), for which the browser plug-in will acknowl-
edge VInt with a rendering manifest. The rendering manifest
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is sent to the trusted context generator À. At the same time,
VInt begins collecting the local context Á. Two things will
be sent back from the service Â: 1) a trusted context and 2)
a breakdown of the web page. The local context is validated
to have the same semantics as the trusted context using the
page breakdown Ã. Any user-provided inputs that the user
entered with POFs (highlighted in Fig 4) are extracted and
stored Ä. During this time, VInt also checks for hardware IO
to ensure the on-screen activities are not entirely forged by
a malware Å. The end of a VInt session is again signaled
by the browser plugin when the user clicks on a predefined
submit button (highlighted in Fig 4). The generated request
will be intercepted by the browser plug-in before transmission
and submitted to VInt for signing Æ. VInt will check if the
request matches the captured user inputs. Upon a successful
match, VInt will sign the requests with its private key for which
a remote service can verify and know that the request comes
from a VInt checker and thus the request is user-intended Ç.
C. Local Context Acquisition
To “see what the user sees”, VInt captures screenshots
of the user interaction while the user interacts with a web
page with a security-sensitive web page. The screenshots are
taken just before the display data is sent to the output device
(sampling a VNC connection) to ensure VInt and the user
agree on the context. In the rest of the paper, we refer to the
series of screenshots taken with the user’s interactions on the
web page as a local context.
VInt collects the local context with randomness to prevent
time-of-check-time-of-use attacks. Periodic context collection
is subject to temporal integrity violation attack [22]. The at-
tacker can expose the proper UI for a small amount of time
and thus the change is unnoticeable by a human user. To solve
this problem, VInt waits for a random time before consecutive
context collections. This way, even if the attacker knows the
presence of VInt, he cannot predict VInt’s collection pattern.
The requirements for the frequency and amount of random-
ness in context collection are contradictory. On one hand, to-
day’s display frame rates have exceeded 60 frames per second
(FPS), but context collection at 60 FPS introduces too much
storage and processing overhead. On the other hand, VInt
needs to collect as frequently as possible to detect possible
integrity violations. A previous study [30] in exposure time
and perceptual memory shows that within a 500 ms exposure
window, a user can only recall 50% of the exposed content.
Therefore, VInt uses 500 ms as the exposure limit. cz assumes
that any tampered content can be exposed to the user for a
maximum of the exposure limit, and the user’s perception will
not be affected. we find that we were able to achieve a good
balance of performance and security by sampling within a
normal distribution around a mean of 250 ms and a standard
deviation of 83 ms, we ensure that 99.73% of the time, the
time between to consecutive context collections will be under
500 ms.
D. Output Integrity and Authenticity
To ensure output integrity and authenticity, different from
prior works’ [4]–[6] export-and-secure approach, VInt opts for
an outsource-and-verify approach, where the rendering is en-
tirely outsourced to the untrusted OS, and VInt only verifies the
final output. Assuming a securely rendered web page (trusted
context) is available for local validation, because a successful
context forgery attacks must change the semantics, output in-
tegrity and authenticity are achieved if the local context has the
same semantics as a trusted context. Therefore, VInt needs to
1) determine what is the semantic-changing difference between
a local context and a trusted context and 2) ensure the absence
of semantic-changing differences.
1) Semantic-changing Differences: It is difficult to con-
struct a system that can classify whether two rendered displays
will be perceived by a human to have the same semantics.
Not only it is difficult for a computer program to measure a
human’s subjective perception, but also current image classifi-
cation algorithms are not perfect and require very large training
sets to be effective. It is not clear how to get a labeled training
set of semantically different images.
Therefore, VInt measures the opposite: the allowable dif-
ference between the two renderings. In benign web pages,
differences can arise due to the specific display, browser, driver,
or hardware used [23], [31]–[33]. We refer to the differences,
due to client-side configurations, as rendering variations. The
rendering variations in prior work [23] are intensified by a
malicious service with the use of special elements such as an
HTML5 canvas, while this paper deals with benign cases.
When comparing two renderings, a naive solution is to
conduct a pixel-by-pixel comparison, but this solution does not
work. Due to rendering variations, the trusted context must
be rendered under the exact same client-side configurations.
However, the number of configurations that can affect the
appearance is more than traditionally considered factors such
as the monitor size, browser and version, GPU driver version,
and GPU hardware type, and it is impossible to collect all
of them. For instance, macOS adjusts the color and intensity
based on ambient sensors and Windows ClearType has a five-
step configuration dialog where each step has 2 to 6 options.
We suspect that there are many other configurations. Plus, due
to the proprietary nature of commercial OSes, it is impossible
to determine what configurations contribute to rendering vari-
ations. These settings, although altering the screen minimally,
will result in false positives in a pixel-by-pixel comparison.
We set up experiments on popular websites to evaluate the
level of benign rendering variations. We chose a total of 119
top-visited websites that consist of various texts, forms, input
boxes, and images. We rendered these websites in various res-
olutions (1024, 1660, 1920, 2560), browsers (Chrome version
81.0.4044.138, Firefox version 76.01, Safari version 12.1.2 and
Edge version 80.0.361.109), OSes (macOS 10.12.6 and Ubuntu
16.04.1) and hardware (Intel Iris Graphics 5100 and Intel HD
Graphics 4000). We chose popular websites because they give
an upper bound on the amount of rendering variations; we
believe security-sensitive pages can be modified to have a
lower level of rendering variations than the popular web sites.
We observed the following typical rendering variations (with
examples in Appendix C): 1) Window size affects the amount
of information in the rendering. 2) OS settings, such as default
font size, change the layout of the rendering. 3)Unique style.
Each browser has unique default style rules. For instance, the
same height in pixels may be interpreted differently in different
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browsers, which means that elements may be slightly shifted
on different renderings. 4) Text difference. The pixel-level
appearance of text is different due to various text-sharpening
techniques. 5) Color difference. Comparing images in img tags,
their size and color differences are minimum: the maximum
we found was 15% in HSV color space.
These rendering variation findings can be classified into three
types based on how a client-side validate should handle them
• Semantic-changing rendering variations (SCRV): benign
variations such as Window Size and OS Settings that
change the semantics of the page because either the page
layout changes or the number of UI elements change.
• Non-semantic-changing rendering variations (NSCRV):
Text and color differences do not change the semantics.
• Correctable: Unique style falls outside of typical varia-
tions, as they can be solved with modifications (CSS reset
scripts) to the web page. VInt assumes that these varia-
tions are dealt with by a service on VInt-enabled pages.
It is difficult for a client-side checker to distinguish these
benign variations from a context forgery attack, which also
changes the semantic of the interface. In the following sec-
tion, we will describe how a validation method handles both
semantic-changing and non-semantic-changing variations, in
order to distinguish semantic differences.
2) Validation Method: The goal of the validation is to 1)
ensure the absence of SCRV but 2) allow NSCRV between the
local context and a trusted context. With the idea that a remote
service can aid in client-side validation, VInt proposes to use
1) a rendering manifest to account for SCRV and 2) a region-
based validation method for NSCRV.
To handle SCRV, VInt constructs a rendering manifest with
the client-side configurations that contribute to SCRV, such as
the window size (width, height) in pixels. With this rendering
manifest, a service can generate a ground truth rendering in a
trusted environment (a.k.a. trusted context) so that, compared
to a local context, there is no SCRV. Even though a more
detailed rendering manifest eases the client-side rendering, it is
a trade-off between service-side and client-side computation.
While the rendering manifest is collected by an untrusted OS
and cannot be trusted, we note that any crafted rendering man-
ifest will not allow an attacker to bypass validation because
it will only result in VInt validating the local context against
another properly rendered context.
To handle NSCRV, VInt develops a region-based valida-
tion method for NSCRV based on image and pixel analysis.
Different UI elements have different validation requirements.
For instance, an attacker can tamper with a single character,
which is only a few pixels difference; while a benign system
may render an image with a color shift, which affects a large
number of pixels. Therefore, VInt decomposes the UI elements
on a context into three types: textual, graphical, input and
applies different validation methods: 1) textual content is com-
pared against the same text in the trusted context using Optical
Character Recognition (OCR) 2) input content is not validated
because its value is user entered (we discuss the integrity of
user inputs in the next section), and 3) graphical content is vali-
dated based on the typical rendering variations we found in the
previous section. Specifically, we define two renderings to be
semantically different if any of the following condition is met.
• Content difference: when one rendering has more text
or images than the other. For instance, an attacker can
add, change or remove text to change the semantics of a
paragraph.
• Color difference: for images, when every pixel of the two
aligned images differs by more than 20% in HSV color
space.
• Position difference: when the relative position of a UI
object differs by 10% of the size of the UI object. Without
position difference, a malicious attacker is free to move
around the UI objects and that changes the semantics. For
instance, an attacker can swap the position of “Confirm”
and “Cancel” buttons and have the user trigger the request
unintentionally.
The classification of UI elements into regions is done by
the service and based on the desired method of validation,
rather than its underlying implementation. The service is re-
sponsible for this classification which can be justified because
they design the web pages. The region classification is sent to
VInt together with the trusted context. We show an example
in Fig 5. The page breakdown is manually annotated with
dashed red lines for illustration purposes. The UI elements in
black are graphical elements and elements in orange are input
elements, and the rest is textual elements. The reason why
the two buttons are different types is because of how they
are constructed — the clear button is image-based, while the
submit button is text-based.
With rendering manifest and region-based validation, the
room for an attack is small. For textual regions, the attacker
cannot tamper with existing texts, due to the accuracy of OCR.
For graphical regions, an attacker cannot violate any of the
constraints set above, which means the attacker can only shift
the UI object within a small region, slightly change the color
of images. We consider those as non-semantic-changing.
E. Input Integrity and Authenticity
To ensure input integrity and authenticity, VInt again opts
for an outsource-and-verify approach, where it outsources the
processing to the untrusted OS, and requires the aid from the
human user to verify the input through an assumption called
”What you enter is what you want” (WYEIWYW). WYEI-
WYW requires the user to ensure that on-screen inputs are
intended. This assumption is justified as human users operating
on security-sensitive pages tend to be more careful in ensuring
they typed the correct values by checking the displayed inputs.
However, the display of user-provided inputs is subject to
temporal integrity because an attacker can tamper with the
value any time after the user enters them. VInt defines tempo-
ral and spatial constraints on the validity of the user-checked
inputs using user focus. The idea is that when a user has a
focus on an input they enter, they can ensure the inputs are
intended. Gyrus [3], which also uses on-screen inputs as user
intention, requires the user to check that all inputs inside a text
input field that are user-intended. This does not only require
extra user effort, but it is also error-prone when the input field
contains many characters, e.g. a long email in a text area. VInt
only requires the user to check inputs as they are being typed.
To track user focus, VInt relies on existing visual indicators
e.g. a focus box and input cursor. We refer to the visual indica-
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tors as the position of focus (POF). There are two properties of
POFs that make them equivalent to a user’s focus: 1) forward
=⇒ : human users rely on POFs to know where to enter text,
thus POF implies user focus and 2) backward ⇐= : when a
human user makes edits, a functioning system must put POF at
the user’s position of edit, thus user focus implies POF. These
two properties give an equivalent relationship ⇐⇒ between
user focus and POF. Further, due to WYEIWYW, user focus
implies user-intended text. Thus, we can say that POF implies
user-intended text. Therefore, VInt can track POF and only
accept text edits accompanied by POF as legitimate user inputs
— edits without POF can be considered non-user-intended.
Currently, the type of POF used in VInt includes selection
highlight, input cursor (caret) and focus box (outline).
POF is input field-dependent and applies to input fields
that have the same appearance value and code value. VInt can
guarantee input integrity by extracting values from the context
because it relies on the direct mapping of appearance value
and code value of inputs in textboxes. However, for other input
fields, such as a drop-down menu, the appearance, and code
value can differ (e.g. a drop-down can show value ”ABC” on
the screen, but the value behind is ”xyz”). This gap prevents
VInt, who only observes the context, from knowing the code
value. However, this limitation can be overcome if VInt and
the services share a scheme for the display value and code
value mapping.
With the POF model defining user actions, VInt can track
POF and only consider edits accompanied by POF as user-
intended; edits without POF can be ignored. Therefore, VInt
must 1) locate and track POF and 2) extract user-provided
inputs at POF.
1) Locate and Track POF: To narrow down the possible
POF styles, VInt requires all VInt-enabled services to adopt a
standard design for all POFs and acknowledge, train and edu-
cate users to recognize the design. If any non-standard design
shows up, the user should be alerted. Then, on the client-side,
VInt performs consistency checks to ensure that 1) only the
standard POFs are presented and 2) no more than one set of
POFs are presented at any given time and 3) no logical errors
such as one input box with a focus box but the other field
has the input cursor. This prevents an attacker from showing
multiple POFs and confusing the user.
Consistency checks do not enforce the absolute correctness
of POFs with regard to the hardware inputs; the checks only
ensure that the user and VInt agree on the shown POFs. Since
POFs are maintained and rendered by the malicious system,
the system can tamper with it in any way it wants; it is difficult
for VInt to determine whether the system has reacted correctly
with respect to the hardware inputs — doing so requires
another trusted system as a reference. Therefore, VInt uses
consistency checks to verify that the system has presented the
POFs consistently during the user’s interaction.
2) Extract user inputs at POF: VInt develops extraction
rules for input methods that can insert multi-characters at once.
Many input methods can insert multiple characters at once
such as copy&paste, drag&drop and multi-characters selec-
tion and deletion. VInt needs to differentiate between multi-
character text entries and malicious tampering. VInt develops
the following extraction rules to cope with multi-character
insertion/deletion.
• Left-side Insertion: inputs can only be inserted on the left
side of the input cursor.
• Left-right Deletion: inputs can be deleted from both sides
of the input cursor.
• Highlight Selection: if multiple characters are selected
(highlighted on the display), they can be deleted at the
same time.
These rules restrict text changes to be near the input cursor and
allow input methods to insert more than one character at a time.
There is no upper bound on the number of characters inserted.
VInt will not accept input changes outside of the user’s vis-
ible area, which can happen when scrolling or input overflow-
ing. There are two cases in which VInt has accepted the inputs
before. If VInt has accepted the inputs before and that input
moves out of the currently visible area, which can happen when
scrolling, VInt will simply not accept changes to that input. if
the user uses an input method that enters multiple characters
in one shot and the added characters overflow the input field,
because the overflown text is never visible on the screen, VInt
will not be able to accept its value. Therefore, VInt requires
services to design textboxes large enough to hold anticipated
inputs so textbox overflow never happens. This requirement
has been acceptable in our experiments with transaction web
pages, as fields like amount, credit card number already have
a fixed length.
It is possible that the user can operate fast enough between
two consecutive collects and trigger a false alarm of the ex-
traction rule. For instance, if the user types a character then
immediately moves the input cursor to the left side of it. This
will trigger a right-hand insertion alarm because to the checker,
the character appears on the right side of the cursor. We think
this is unlikely as a recent study [34] shows that an experi-
enced typist has a typing speed of 62 words per minute, which
translates to 1.3 characters between two consecutive context
collections. Another way to solve this is to relax the left-side
insertion rule to a left-right insertion rule with a maximum
number of 1 character of the right side of the input cursor.
Due to the fact that VInt extracts inputs from the context,
an attacker is forced to leave a visual footprint in order to
tamper with or forge network requests. Any abnormal behavior
will be caught, depending on what is being tampered with: 1)
POFs tampering will be caught by consistency checks 2) user
input tampering will be ignored by VInt unless it is near the
POF, and 3) input tampering near the POF will be caught and
corrected by the human user.
To prevent malware from crafting an entire interaction
session, VInt requires on-screen activities to follow hardware
IO events. For instance, if the cursor is moving, then there
must be hardware IO from the mouse; if the text is being
entered, then there must be hardware IO from the keyboard.
Because the hardware IO check is only to complement context
validation, and the semantics of user inputs are extracted from
the context, this means the hardware IO check can be coarse-
grained: VInt only checks for the existence of the hardware IO
when there are on-screen activities. For instance, when the user
presses ”a”, the user also expects ”a” on the display. Because
VInt extracts user inputs from the display, there is no need to
interpret the semantic of the hardware IO event for the press
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”a”. With the help of recent hardware virtualization extension
(e.g. Intel VT), the code base is as be small.
The semantics of the user inputs can be acquired from the
contextual information such as form labels. In the common
case, form labels are placed on the left side of the input fields.
For instance, the label ”Amount” on the left side of the textbox
suggests that the text value is for the amount. The user inputs
and input labels tuple, e.g. (”Amount”, 100), allow VInt to
check outgoing requests.
F. Outgoing Requests
The final outgoing request must be submitted by the local
OS, and VInt requires two conditions before signing it: 1)
whether the output was ever tampered with during the user
interaction session and 2) whether the request was generated
from user-intended inputs. The first condition ensures output
integrity, authenticity and temporal integrity while the second
condition ensures input integrity and authenticity are carried
over to the request. When all five properties are achieved, we
conclude the request to be user-intended. VInt signs any user-
intended request with its private key, and services can validate
the signature using the public key. Any unsigned request can
be deemed as non-user-intended.
VInt assumes a format of outgoing requests. VInt assumes
that the web page sends a list of input labels and input values to
the service, where the user label is the form label that appears
on the left side of a form input field, which VInt uses to collect
user inputs. This allows VInt to perform a check on the request
by checking 1) whether all collected input labels are presented
in the request and 2) whether all input values are identical
between VInt’s collection and the request. VInt will not sign
the request if a check fails. The web page gets notified by the
browser plugin when this happens.
VInt does not support more than one request at a time.
However, we believe that VInt can be enhanced to support
multiple concurrent requests if there is a unique identification
on the user interface that VInt can extract and link to the
request. This identification must be unique for all browser tabs
on all browsers on the user client.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
VInt has three parts: a trusted context generator on the
service side, an untrusted browser plug-in, and a trusted
checker on the client-side. To implement the checker, VInt
employs a virtual machine (VM)-based isolation to separate the
checker from the untrusted client OS. We implemented VInt
using a Linux/Xen host running Ubuntu 16.04 and a dom-U
also running Ubuntu 16.04. We note that VInt’s architecture
is limited to neither the host software configuration nor the
desktop environment. For instance, VInt could use a micro-
hypervisor [35], [36] for a reduced footprint. It can also be
ported to the Android platform with minimum changes.
A. Browser Plug-in and Rendering Manifest
We implement the browser plug-in in Chrome. The browser
plug-in signals the start when a VInt-enabled page has been
loaded; it signals the end when it sees a submit button has been
clicked. The browser plugin communicates with the trusted
checker through the network, where it sends data designated
for the checker to a predefined IP address. After the page is
loaded, the plug-in constructs a rendering manifest and sends it
to the checker. VInt only requires the window resolution to be
submitted in the rendering manifest, which specifies the height
and width of the window in pixels. The window resolution
accounts for both the size of the browser window and the
OS default font size (when the default font size increases, the
window size gets smaller).
Because the browser plug-in runs in the untrusted guest OS,
its data are not trusted by VInt. The start signal cannot be fired
ahead of time or delayed because VInt immediately begins
validation and expects an unfilled empty page (no user inputs).
The end signal cannot be fired in advance or postponed because
VInt checks for the position of the cursor and hardware IO: 1)
the cursor must fall on a submit button and 2) there must be
a hardware click event from the mouse before the end signal.
The impact of a fake rendering manifest has been discussed
in §III-D.
B. Checker
The checker is implemented inside a dom0 secure virtual
machine on Xen hypervisor. Due to the split driver model in
Xen, guest hardware IO activities are visible to the dom0.
Thus, we collect USB data simply through a usbmon and we
monitor the guest network IO through tcpdump. VInt assumes
that the user interface is set up through a VNC connection,
thus, the checker collects the local context by sampling this
connection.
Validation Method. The validation method relies on Tesser-
act [37] for Optical Character Recognition (OCR) and OpenCV
for image analysis. User scrolling is handled by image align-
ment. The exact algorithm is listed in Appendix B.
Consistency Checks. VInt locates the POF using image anal-
ysis and enforces consistency checks on the focus box, input
cursor and selection highlight. The appearance of POFs are
listed in §III-A.
1) Performance Considerations: Difference Detection.
Due to the frequent screenshots, the difference between every
two consecutive screenshots mostly occurs in a small area.
Therefore, rather than re-validating the whole page, VInt limits
the scope of validation to the difference between the current
frame and the previous frame, which provides a significant
speed-up of the content validation.
Cache. VInt relies heavily on caching to improve performance.
There are currently three levels of cache: text, graphics, and
frame. The text cache caches the OCR results, which saves re-
peated computation on recognizing the same text. The graphics
cache caches the results of pixel validation; this cache is hit
when only a graphic region is not changed. Finally, there is
a cache for the entire frame, which has a high hit rate when
the user idles. We opt for conservative caching behavior by
using SHA256 digest of an image as the cache key meaning
that a single pixel difference between two images will prevent
them from sharing the cached result. SHA256 achieve a decent
balance between low collision and performance, but if small
variation should be accounted, another implementation option
is to use an image hash [24].
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V. LIMITATIONS
Dynamic Content. Some pages change appearances based on
user inputs through JavaScript, VInt, at its current stage, does
not handle any dynamic content. VInt treats the entire display
as a static image for comparison with a static remote context
image. It is possible to extend the checker to validate the local
context against a set of allowable user interface.
Non-service-controlled content. Advertisements inside
iframes are provided by third parties (e.g. advertisement
providers), and the service may not know the appearance of
the content. There are two concerns: 1) the third party may
launch a context forgery attack using the iframe it controls,
and 2) the appearance of any third-party content cannot
be included in the trusted context. Therefore, VInt requires
any non-service-controlled content to be removed from
security sensitive pages or the service includes the expected
appearances in the trusted context.
VI. EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
A. Security Evaluation
1) Existing Attacks: We discuss how VInt defeat against
user-impersonating attacks.
Request Forgery. There are two cases with request forgery
depending on whether the request was forged or tampered. A
forged request does not have a context associated with it, while
for a tampered request, the outgoing network requests will be
different from user-provided on-screen inputs, the checker will
not sign the request.
Service UI Tampering. Service UI violations (Fig 7 and 1)
cannot happen due to UI validation. The attacker has to either
change textual or graphical elements on the display to affect
the user’s perception. Those modifications will be detected by
the UI validation step, and any requests generated from those
contexts will not be signed.
Host UI Tampering. There are two cases when user-provided
inputs are being tampered: with and without POF. In the first
case, since VInt performs consistency checks, there is only one
set of POF on the user interface, and since VInt requires hard-
ware IO, thus a user must be present, assuming the physical
user enforces WYEIWYW, the user will correct any tampering.
In the latter case, inputs tampered without POF will be ignored
by VInt, for which the request generated from this context will
differ from what VInt extracted, and VInt will not sign the
request.
Temporal Integrity. First, due to the randomness in VInt’s
context collection (§III-C), it is unlikely (0.27%) that any out-
put integrity violation will be undetected for longer than 500
ms, which was the exposure limit VInt picked. If the violation
is detected, then the UI validation will fail, and thus VInt will
not sign the final request.
2) Adaptive Attacker: An adaptive attacker may use ad-
versarial examples to fool the OCR into having a different
understanding of the user interface than a human user. We
acknowledge the existence of generic [38], [39] and OCR-
specific [40]–[42] attacks, it is unknown how effective these
attacks are against VInt. First of all, the field of adversarial
Modules Lines of code (LOC)
Context Analysis
VInt 1,403
CPython 1,092,486
OpenCV 2,053,651
Tesseract 204,779
Hypervisor
QEMU 1,625,674
Dom0 kernel 17,193,756
Xen 546,856
TABLE II: Trusted Computing Base (TCB) of VInt.
example defenses is rapidly evolving [43], [44]; these de-
fenses can be integrated into VInt. Secondly, OCR systems
are harder to attack as a human user will alert to perceivable
perturbations. Lastly, current OCR systems are different from
traditional deep neural nets, it is an end-to-end neural network
where any perturbation needs to cross many characters [41],
which make these modifications more obvious to a human
user. In conclusion, the focus of this paper is not to defend
against adversarial example attacks, but these attacks have the
potential to cause VInt to have a wrong understanding of the
user interface.
3) Trusted Computing Base (TCB) Size: The TCB of VInt
is detailed in Table II. The majority of TCB comes from
two parts: 1) userspace libraries, which includes OpenCV and
Tesseract and 2) the hypervisor. For the userspace libraries, we
provide the following arguments and potential improvements.
Firstly, we use only a small portion of the libraries; not all
code in the libraries are needed for VInt. We believe that
code minimization can significantly reduce the amount of code
in those libraries. Secondly, these libraries are offline tools
and do not communicate with the outside world. Therefore,
they are hardly exploitable compared to drivers. And lastly,
our libraries run in dom0, which should be protected by the
hypervisor from a malicious guest. The large TCB for dom0
kernel and the hypervisor is due to our choice of hypervisor
and the driver model of Xen. Rather than using Xen, VInt can
be implemented with micro-hypervisors such as Bitvisor [36]
and XMHF [35] to minimize the codebase.
Compared to other works, it is worth noting that VInt does
not require a trusted rendering stack [4]–[6], or any external
devices [5], [6]. If VInt were to be implemented using micro-
hypervisors, the only additional drivers needed would be a
simple network driver and a simplified USB driver for the
existence of the USB hardware IO (as opposed to full USB
drivers). A micro network stack such as uIP [45] contains less
than 3k LOC.
B. Empirical Evaluation
We aim to answer the following questions empirically.
• Q1: What is the accuracy of VInt’s UI validation in dis-
tinguishing semantic-changing differences? (§VI-B2)
• Q2: How much overhead does VInt introduce to a network
request on commercial web pages? (§VI-B3)
1) Data Composition: Ideally, end-to-end evaluation of
VInt requires us to manually modify the web page source to
comply with VInt’s requirements and then render the modified
web page as a trusted context, and then simulate local context
by creating attack variants. This method is not scalable and
requires a large amount of manual effort. We want to precisely
evaluate VInt’s accuracy and performance. In essence, VInt
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Configurations W/O SD W SD
Mac Chrome and Firefox (MCMF) 19 100
Mac Chrome and Safari (MCMS) 16 103
Mac Chrome and Edge (MCME) 34 85
Mac Chrome and Ubuntu Chrome (MCUC) 35 84
Mac Firefox and Ubuntu Firefox (MFUF) 16 103
Ubuntu Chrome and Firefox set 1 (UCUF1) 16 103
Ubuntu Chrome and Firefox set 2 (UCUF2) 15 104
Total 164 669
TABLE III: The make-up of VInt’s evaluation set. SD stands for
semantic difference. The number refers to the number of pairs of
web page renderings with (W SD) or without (W/O SD) semantic
differences.
compares two contexts to ensure the absence of semantic-
changing rendering variations (SCRV). Thus, to obtain pairs
of renderings with and without SCRV, we render commercial
web pages in various rendering configurations while fixing
configurations included in the rendering manifest defined in
§III. Then, we can then use one set to emulate a local context
and use another set as a trusted context. An accurate checker
should be able to predict whether renderings have SCRV. We
evaluate VInt’s accuracy and performance on pairs of render-
ings of commercial web pages.
We collected 119 pages consisting of 116 popular commer-
cial websites and three context forgery attack examples crafted
by us corresponding to minimum UI tampering, context hiding,
and temporal integrity violation. This collection is diverse and
consists of 1) text-only pages: VInt can be used to ensure the
proper display of contents 2) pages with clickable buttons:
VInt can be used to ensure that user clicks are user-intended,
and 3) forms: VInt can confirm that user-provided inputs and
user clicks are user-intended. The whole collection is good to
illustrate VInt’s capability, but are not the most representative
use case of VInt. We envision VInt to be used on forms to
collect user-intended inputs. A representative set of 25 forms
are selected out of the 119 pages for performance analysis.
We obtain renderings of the pages in various render-
ing configurations. We vary the browser (Chrome version
81.0.4044.138, Firefox version 76.01, Safari version 12.1.2 and
Edge version 80.0.361.109), OS (macOS 10.12.6 and Ubuntu
16.04.1) and hardware (Intel Iris Graphics 5100 and Intel HD
Graphics 4000) in the rendering process. We use Selenium’s
WebDriver API to obtain the rendering.
To evaluate the accuracy of VInt validation method, we
manually selected seven pairs of rendering configurations, and
see if VInt can predict whether the pair has any semantic
difference compared to our manual labels. For attack examples,
we render the original page in one configuration and the attack
in a different configuration, thus, they receive a false label to
indicate the difference. We present the make-up of the dataset
in Table III. With a false label meaning that the pair of render-
ings contain semantic differences, the reasons for the majority
of the pairs being different are as follows, (with examples in
Appendix D)
• Different appearance due to advertisements and web page
content, which violates our content difference rule in the
definition of semantic-changing differences. The different
appearances can carry different semantics and thus VInt
must detect it.
• Different spacing, which violates our position difference
rule. VInt expects texts to be at roughly the same position,
Configurations TP TN FP FN
MCMF 100 17 2 0
MCMS 103 13 3 0
MCME 85 31 3 0
MCUC 88 29 2 0
MFUF 103 13 3 0
UCUF1 103 14 2 0
UCUF2 104 15 0 0
Total 686 132 15 0
Precision 97.86 %
Recall 100 %
Accuracy 98.2 %
TABLE IV: UI validation accuracy result. On the left is the break-
down of the number of pairs of web page renderings. On the right is
the total percentage.
otherwise, it cannot distinguish benign text shift from ma-
licious text tampering. However, we observed that there
are pages, such as Apple and Google Play Store, that
never suffer from spacing issues across rendering envi-
ronments. This proves our assumption that pages can be
modified to reduce rendering variations and specifically,
spacing issues.
• Pop-up windows, which also violates our content differ-
ence rule. A rendering with a pop-up window carries
different semantics, and VInt must detect it.
Even though the number of pairs of web pages without
semantic difference is low, the pairs of web pages with seman-
tic differences simulate various types of context forgery at-
tacks. Specifically, advertisements and page content difference
simulate service UI tampering, while pop up windows simu-
late temporal integrity violations caught by VInt. If VInt can
achieve high accuracy on this set, then we can conclude that
VInt is good at detecting semantic difference while allowing
non-semantic difference.
2) Q1: Validation Accuracy: In this section, we aim to
figure out the accuracy of UI validation. In this experiment,
we simulate a local context and a trusted context using a pair
of renderings on different platforms. Because VInt requires
the service to mark the regions for validation, we opt for
a coarse-grained region marking scheme by treating all text
regions, found by a text detector, as text regions for validation
while leaving the rest as graphical regions. This coarse-grained
marking scheme may not be perfect as the text detector may
not give perfect results. In deployment, we envision the region
marking scheme to be done by a developer on the service side.
We compare the results given by the UI validation against our
manual labels and show the result in Table IV. We use true
positive to denote pages with semantic-changing differences
and are detected by VInt. The high recall rate on the commer-
cial website collection proofs VInt’s robustness.
The reasons for the false positives, where pages without
semantic-changing difference are being flagged by VInt are
listed below (with examples provided in Appendix E)
• Foreign language on the website for language selection
(six cases). VInt currently only supports English and thus
OCR returns gibberish values for foreign language and
thus fails text validation.
• OCR did not properly recognize text with mixed font sizes
in the same line (three cases).
• Our coarse-grained web page segmentation method mis-
takenly treats text in images as actual text regions but
OCR did not properly recognize those text (six cases).
We think these are limitations of the component tools in
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Resolution 1024 1680 1920 2550
Mean 1.78/1.12 3.05/2.27 3.45/2.53 5.62/4.55
STDV 1.74/0.57 1.6/0.71 1.80/0.55 2.14/0.65
Median 1.05/0.91 2.36/2 2.7/2.32 4.42/4.32
Max 10.09/3.26 10.96/4.45 12.2/4.33 13.42/10.5
TABLE V: Number of seconds to validate the first frame of pages
in the whole collection/representative collection by resolution.
Components 1024 1680 1920 2550
Text Detection 45.98 57.55 62.78 72.52
Text Recognition 52.47 40.72 35.34 25.65
Pixel Comparison 0.2 1.25 0.33 0.29
Disk IO 1.06 0.28 1.35 1.39
TABLE VI: Average percentage of validation time by VInt’s internal
components.
VInt; they can be mitigated by restricting the page styling on
the service side. For foreign languages, it is possible for a ser-
vice to use an image-based (nation flags) language selector so
that VInt will perform pixel comparison instead of attempting
to extract text. Similarly, our OCR engine is never trained to
recognize mixed font sizes, thus either the service will have
to remove the style or mark text with different font sizes in
separate text regions. Finally, coarse-grained region marking
can be improved by each individual service for finer-grained
region marking.
3) Q2: Validation Performance: We evaluate the perfor-
mance of UI validation. VInt sits on the critical path between
the client and the service, thus any request sent to the service is
delayed until VInt’s validation finishes. Due to the difference
detection method described in Section IV-B1. VInt spends the
majority of its time on the first frame and is significantly faster
for the subsequent frames. Therefore, we separately evaluate
the two scenarios. All evaluations in this section are done
on the renderings in the UCUF1 configuration on a desktop
computer with a quad-core Intel i7-7700 and 16 GB of RAM
and an Nvidia 1060 GPU with 6GB of video RAM. The dom-
U runs 7 logical cores and dom-0 runs 1 logical core and 1GB
of RAM.
First Frame. We measure the performance of VInt on the
first frame of a user interaction session. VInt is an online tool,
meaning that, as soon as the context collection begins, the
validation also begins. The subsequent frames are not validated
until the first one finishes. Therefore, we measure the average
number of seconds VInt spends on the first frame of the pages
in our data collection in various resolutions. The result is
shown in Table V.
Overall, the performance numbers for the representative set
are much lower than the numbers for the whole collection. We
hypothesize that forms tend to have less number of content
(text and graphical elements). To figure out why our represen-
tative set is faster, we conducted a micro-benchmark.
We profiled VInt with cProfile and found that the majority
of the time is consumed by component tools such as text detec-
tion and recognition. We show the percentage by each compo-
nent for all pages in our dataset in Table VI. In this experiment,
we use the renderings from UCUF1 in 1024 resolution.
To improve VInt’s performance, we can improve the per-
formance of text detection and recognition. Our choice of text
detector [46] can be replaced with recent works [47]–[51] for
With User Activity Without User Activity
Mean 0.165 0.07
STDV 0.116 0.0017
TABLE VII: Average number of seconds that VInt needs to validate
a subsequent frame under 1920 resolution.
better performance. Specifically, FOTS [50] achieves roughly
40% more FPS compared to ours, and, if adopted, we estimate
an overall improvement between 18.39% and 29% . Our choice
of text detector [37] can be replaced with performance-turned
OCR engines [52], [53]. Also, the tools we use are a generic
scene detector and OCR, but VInt only works with text on web
pages which tends to be more well-formatted and structured.
Therefore, we expect the performance can be further improved
with tools specifically designed for the web page text.
Subsequent Frames. We tested VInt’s performance on subse-
quent frames with frame difference and cache. We created a
recording, in 1920 by 1080 resolution, of the user filling out a
form. We measure the time that VInt requires to validate the
subsequent frames. The result is shown in Table VII.
Because of the fast validation time of the subsequent
frames, it is possible for VInt to make up the time spent on
validating the first frame. For simplicity, let us assume that a
user spends half of the time entering inputs and half of the
time idling, and VInt collects local context exactly four times a
second. Then, for 1920 resolution with a mean validation time
of 2.53s (from Table V), when the length of the user interaction
is longer than 5.38 seconds, then VInt will be able to com-
pletely make-up the time for the first frame. In other words, if
the user session is long than 5.38 seconds, the user will only
experience a validation delay of 0.165 seconds on the 1920
resolution. We think that most user interactions are longer than
this delay [54], [55]. We also think the performance overhead is
negligible, as a user’s tolerable waiting time is 2 seconds [56].
VInt currently only uses a single logical core, and its
performance can be improved by utilizing more cores. VInt’s
operation is highly scalable, as each sample of local context
can be dedicated to a single core. However, since the total
amount of computation resources on the client is fixed, there
is a trade-off between the amount of computation used by VInt
and the amount available to the user.
VII. RELATED WORKS
This section discusses related works. We group related
works into two categories 1) user interface (UI) attacks and
defenses and 2) user intention capture.
A. User Interface Attacks and Defenses
1) Attacks: User interface (UI) attacks aim at confusing
and luring the user to perform unintended actions through a
deceptive UI. We note that if an OS-level attacker attempts
to change the UI related to a web page to cause unintended
requests to be sent out, then it is a context forgery attack.
Phishing is one example. In a phishing attack, a server-side
attacker aims to lure the user into providing sensitive data
(e.g. usernames and passwords) to an unintended service [57]–
[61]. VInt does not defend against phishing attacks, as 1) VInt
assumes a client-side attacker and 2) VInt requires cooperation
from the legitimate service.
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Another class of UI attacks is clickjacking, which is pop-
ular on Android [62], [63] and the web [7], [8]. There are
several variants: 1) malicious opaque overlay: the victim is
overlaid partially or entirely, while the user sees and thinks she
is interacting with the web page on top, her inputs, such as
mouse clicks, are hijacked and passed to the overlaid victim,
triggering unintended behaviors [7], [64]. 2) transparent over-
lay: a transparent overlay is put on top of the user interface,
capturing the user’s operations [22], [65]–[68]. 3) context hid-
ing: an opaque overlay of the entire screen except for overlay-
protected elements [63]. This variant is used to cope with
overlay prevention mechanisms deployed in Android.
Clickjacking and context forgery have different attack
goals. Clickjacking aims to cause unintended operations on
the user client, but a context forgery attacker is interested in
sending unintended requests to a service. Clickjacking can be
used to launch a context forgery attacks. Secondly, in this
work, we address context forgery in an OS-compromise envi-
ronment, while clickjacking assumes a remote attacker with a
malicious application or web page. The high privilege allows a
context forgery attacker to modify the user interface at various
levels including kernel drivers, which traditional clickjacking
attackers cannot do.
2) Defenses: Protection against phishing has been exten-
sively studied and is commonly implemented using black-
lists [69]–[71].
There are two root causes of clickjacking: 1) illegal passing
of inputs and 2) UI tampering [7]. Simply stopping apps from
passing inputs [72] or acknowledging the application when
user inputs were provided with an obscured flag [73] raises
compatibility issues. To prevent UI tampering, some tech-
niques analyze the application in a pre-deployment phase for
malicious behavior [65], [74], [75]. On the client-side, there are
techniques that 1) indicate to the client that they should not be
overlaid [76]–[78], and 2) detect malicious overlays [62], [65],
[79]–[81]. These client-side defenses require a policy enforcer
or detector. In an OS-compromised environment, the integrity
of that software may not hold.
The idea of comparing two renderings to detect tampering
is not new [25], [59], [80], [82], but the difficulty is 1) robust to
allowable difference and sensitive to tampering and 2) working
in an OS-compromised environment.
B. User Intention Capture
The comparison of these works in terms of the properties of
human-machine channel is discussed in §II-C. None of these
works provides full output integrity guarantee as VInt does.
1) Heuristics-based: Binder [2] and NAB [1] leverage tim-
ing as a heuristic to guess whether an outgoing network request
is user-intended. Specifically, both works state that outgoing
network packets that occur shortly after user hardware IO, e.g.
a keyboard press, are user-intended. However, these works do
not check the content of the packets, thus an attacker can send
crafted or tampered requests in the background when there
are user activities. The problem is known as the “semantic
gap” [83], [84]. Gyrus [3] shares a similar insight in using
on-screen user-provided inputs as user-intended inputs. Gyrus
requires the user to verify Gyrus’ captured inputs, which is
extra user effort. VInt develops a model of the validity of
user-intended inputs using visual indicators and extracts user-
provided inputs as user operates, minimizing the user’s effort.
2) Confirmation: The service can send confirmations (resp.
notification) of the request to the user through a secure chan-
nel, allowing the user to explicitly (resp. implicitly) confirm
their intention. Confirmation is widely adopted in real life and
research. For instance, a user’s operation on the web may need
to be confirmed through an SMS message from the service.
In academics, UTP [12] uses Intel TXT residing on the host
computer as the secure channel. And similarly, ZTIC [85] uses
an external device.
Confirmation 1) requires an additional trusted channel and
2) the secure channel may no longer be secure. As devices
are getting more interconnected, traditionally assumed secure
channels may not be secure anymore. For instance, modern
OSes integrate a mobile interface that allows the user to
read/write SMS messages from their desktop computer [86],
[87]. If the desktop is compromised, then, the confirmation
message, as shown on the desktop computer, can be altered
destroying the security guarantees. VInt does not rely on a
separate physical device or any additional secure channel.
3) Secure IO, Display and Execution: This set of work
relies on trusted input and output for client interactions with the
idea that if the user sees a securely generated display, she will
interact in a way that reflects her intention. Notable systems are
VButton [4], Fedelius [5] and ProtectION [6]. They all secure
the user’s input, deploy embedded trusted displays for com-
puter output, and protect the request generation. VButton is
based on ARM TrustZone, while Fedelius and ProtectION rely
on external hardware for secure IO. VButton implements two
models, one with an embedded trusted button, and the other
displays a confirmation message in a secure popup window
(referred two as VB-B and VB-W, respectively, in Table I).
Not only they only provide partial integrity, they also
suffer a dilemma between functionality richness and secu-
rity as discussed in §II-C. In addition, these systems are
architecture/hardware-dependent. VInt uses the outsource-and-
verify approach, thus it does not need to secure a rendering
engine; it can be implemented using a security-orient hyper-
visor [35], [36], [88]–[90] with a smaller TCB.
VIII. FUTURE WORK
Port VInt to Android. The idea of context verification is
neither platform nor architecture-limited, VInt’s current im-
plementation can be ported to Android. While WYEIWYW
remains the same on Android, when a user types, on-screen
keyboards can be validated [91] and keyboard press shade,
popup, and input cursor can be used as POF for input extrac-
tion, they all satisfy the two properties of POF. In fact, the
checker can be implemented in Arm TrustZone’s secure world,
which provides isolation from the normal world.
To conclude, in this paper, we identified a new class of user-
impersonating attack, called context forgery, that leverages
the modification of user interface to trick a human user into
sending out unintended network requests. Using the properties
of the human-machine channel, we showed that prior intention
capturing works are vulnerable to context forgery attacks. We
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introduced Verified Intention (VInt) and demonstrated how it
can deliver only user-intended requests to a remote service.
Specifically, VInt ensures the local user interface is free from
tampering by checking it against a context rendered in a trusted
environment — VInt checks for the absence of semantic-
changing difference. For user-intended inputs, VInt extracts the
on-screen user-provided textual inputs when there is hardware
IO so that a malware cannot forge on-screen activities. Our
evaluation shows that VInt is accurate and efficient.
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APPENDIX A
EXAMPLES OF CONTEXT FORGERY ATTACKS
Transaction Details
....
Recipient:
Amount:
Bob:    1563519
John:   1693245
Recent recipients
....
Bob:    1565319
John:   1693245
Fig. 7: Minimum UI Tampering: assuming Alice relies on
the account number from recent recipients to retrieve Bob’s
account number. An attacker can alter Bob’s account number
to a different value, perhaps, Mallory’s account number, and
trick Alice into believing that she is sending money to Bob,
but instead she is sending it to Mallory.
APPENDIX B
THE EXACT VALIDATION ALGORITHM
Algorithm 1: VInt’s Validation Method
Input: Loc: local context
Trst: trutsed context
T: text positions
G: graphical elements positions
I: input positions
Output: True if Loc and Trst are semantically equivalent
1 LocTextPos = TextDetect(Loc);
2 TextPosCheck(LocTextPos, T);
3 for every text position TextPos in T do
4 LocText = TextRecognition(TextPos on Loc);
5 TrstText = TextRecognition(TextPos on Trst);
6 ValidateText(LocText, TrstText);
7 for every input position InputPos in I do
8 POFPos = POFDetection(InputPos on Loc);
9 LocInput = TextRecognition(InputPos on Loc);
10 ValidateInputs(LocInput, POFPos, HistoricalInputs);
11 Labels = ExtractLables(InputPos on Loc);
12 StoreInputs(Labels, LocInput, HistoricalInputs);
13 for every graphical element position GrphcPos in G do
14 ValidateGraphics(GrphcPos on Loc, GrphcPos on
Trst);
The validation algorithm is listed in Algorithm 1. The
purpose of line 1 and 2 is to ensure the local context has
the exact number of text as the trusted context. TextDetect
uses the EAST text detector [46], and for which the result is
compared with breakdown from the service. The breakdown
consists of a list of text positions (T) encoded in the format
of (x, y, w, h), where (x,y) represents the top, left position of
the box surrounding the text and w and h represent the width
and height of the box.
The loop at line 3 iterates over each text boxes and invokes
Optical Character Recognition (OCR) engine to recognize the
text. This recognition is done twice, once on the local context
and once on the trusted context. This design choice is made to
simplify the workflow. One alternative is to have the service
send text along with the position information. TextRecognition
is configured to 1) recognize Enligsh characters only 2) uses a
dictionary of common English words to improve accuracy. It
also attempts to optimize the input image before recognition.
Optimization includes
• Binarization: text regions are binarized into black text on
a white background.
• Scaling: binarized text regions are enlarged for better
OCR accuracy [92].
• Stroke sharpening: strokes in text regions are sharpened.
• Alignment: local image is aligned to the trusted image to
handle scrolling.
Function ValidateText compares extracted text from OCR. It
accounts for the possible mistakes using the length of the text
and a history of prior recognized values. When comparing two
texts, VInt attempts to do a string comparison when the confi-
dence returned by the OCR engine is high (≥ 70), otherwise,
VInt falls back to a basic pixel-level comparison.
The loop at line 7 iterates over each input box, attempts
to see if it is under a user’s focus and invokes OCR engine to
extract inputs. Only inputs with a user’s focus is allowed to
change from previous extracted values. Function ValidateIn-
puts performs 1) finds inputs modifications based on historical
inputs and 2) determines whether the inputs modifications are
at POF. Any input modifications not at POF will result in
failed validation. Finally, input labels are extracted and stored
together with inputs in historical inputs used for future frames.
Similar to text validation, the loop at line 13 validates
graphical elements. The exact validation method includes
• Alignment: the graphical elements on Loc and Trst are
aligned.
• Color difference: color differences between the graphical
regions are calculated in HSV color space.
• Color validation: the validation checks for the color dif-
ference at pixel level with a threshold of 15% for hue,
saturation and brightness while accounting for value wrap
around such as hue value 0 and hue value 359. Noisy
under 1/70 of the width and height of the input images
are removed. This threshold is chosen by experiments.
The algorithm for the subsequent frames is similar to
Algo 1 with the addition of caches mentioned in §IV, and an
additional function DifferenceDetection that finds the area of
difference between two subsequent frames of the local context.
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APPENDIX C
EXAMPLES OF RENDERING VARIATIONS
Examples of the browser-unique styles can be found at
https://github.com/sw4/revert.css.
Fig. 8: Resolution. Rendering of quora.com in 1024 * 768 reso-
lution (left) and in 2560 * 1440 resolution (right). The amount of
information in the background visible to the user differs in the two
renderings, and thus the semantic of the rendering differs.
Fig. 9: Pixel-level Difference of Text. The same text is rendered
in different browsers. We see that the text height, width, brightness,
space to the next character and color all vary in the pixel level.
APPENDIX D
EXAMPLES OF SEMANTIC DIFFERENT RENDERINGS
We show examples of the semantic-changing difference
between two renderings of the same website. All renderings
are from our evaluation collection.
Fig. 10: Advertisements. Rendering of Allrecipies.com on Mac Fire-
fox (left) and Mac Safari (right). The advertisement on the top of the
page shows differently in two renderings.
Fig. 11: Different web content. Rendering of Yellowpages.com on
Mac Firefox Mac Firefox (left) and Mac Safari (right). The back-
ground image shows differently in two renderings.
Fig. 12: Spacing. Rendering of craigslist.org on Mac Firefox Mac
Firefox (left) and Mac Safari (right). The spacing of text is not
consistent on two renderings.
Fig. 13: Pop up Window. Rendering of forbes.com on Mac Firefox
Mac Firefox (left) and Mac Safari (right). The rendering on the
left has an additional pop-up window which is not presented in the
rendering on the right.
APPENDIX E
EXAMPLES OF FAILED VALIDATION
We show example causes of false positives in VInt’s vali-
dation.
Fig. 14: A language selection bar on facebook.com where VInt failed
to recognize the text.
Fig. 15: Mixed font sizes on xfinity.com where VInt fails to recognize
the text.
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Fig. 16: An example of failed validation due to the coarse-grained
region marking on play.google.com. The text ”The invisible man” in
the image is being mis-detected resulting in failed recognition and
comparison.
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